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RESPONSE: PORNOGRAPHY AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT*
Frederick Schauer**

Imagine a scientific genuis compelled to make a choice between two
projects. He has the ability to design a new version of the hydrogen
bomb, capable of killing more people with less effort than any existing weapon. He also has the ability to design a process for the
manufacture of edible food from sand, grass, and salt water, a process that would end hunger and starvation throughout the world.
Owing to a shortage of time and funds, he must choose between
projects. He choose.s to design the bomb, thereby causing the production of the world's most efficfent and destructive weapon.
Would it be proper to criticize our scientist by saying that he
has designed bad bomb? Of course not. His choice of goals is
morally outrageous, 1 and justifiably subject to criticism on those
grounds. But the wrongfulness of his choice of ends has no bearing.
on the evaluation of how well he has accomplished his chosen ends.
We can properly say he has done his job well, yet at the same time
say that he has erred in his choice. of job. The fact that he is a bad
man does not mean that he has designed a bad bomb.
This distinction between criticism of ends and criticism of
means is germane to Professor Feinberg's commentary on Supreme
Court decisions dealing with pornographic materials. 2 Professor
Feinberg employs the thesis of liberalism that harm to others and
the prevention of nuisance are the only permissible justifications for

a
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1. Whether the wrongfulness of his choice lies in designing the bomb, in not designing
the food manufacturing process, or both, is a question that encompasses virtually the entire
range of moral philosophy. Deontological ethics in the Kantian tradition would focus almost
exclusively on the wrongfulness of designing the bomb, rather than on the good that could
have been done by designing the food manufacturing process. See, e.g., C. F'ruED, RIGHT AND
WRONG (1978); W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GooD (1930); Williams, A Critique of
Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. SMART & B. WILLIAMs, UTILITARIANISM: FoR & AGAINST 77 (1973). By
contrast, ethical theories variously described as utilitarian, teleological, or consequentialist
would find as much if not more wrong in what was not done as in what was done. See, e.g.,
CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM (M. Bayles ed. 1968); J. BENTHAM, AN lNTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MoRALS AND LEGISLATION (1789); J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of
Utilitarian Ethics, in J.J.C. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FoR & AGAINST 3 (1973).
2. Feinberg, Pornography and the Criminal Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REv. 567 (1979).
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criminal penalties. 3 He then evaluates the doctrines of the Supreme
Court in terms of that benchmark of liberalism. Such criticism assumes, however, that liberalism is a goal that the Constitution and
the Court share with Professor Feinberg. But that assumption is
erroneous. The Court's goal in the "obscenity" cases is to define the
limits of the concept of freedom of speech. 4 The initial evaluation
of Supreme Court decisions in this area ought to be in terms of that
goal. It may well turn out that the Court has served its goal quite
well, but that it has defined its goal either erroneously or too narrowly.
I propose, therefore, to evaluate this same body of law in terms
of the goals of free speech rather than the goals of liberalism. I
believe that these goals are in la.rge part distinct and must be separated for purposes of analysis. It is a fundamental error to treat
freedom of speech as congruent with liberal political or social philosophy, just as it is a fundamental error to treat freedom of speech as
a mere subset of liberalism.
Let us first, therefore, look at the three basic elements5 of the
Supreme Court's test for the determination of legal obscenity: appeal to the prurient interest; patent offensiveness; and lack of serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 6
Attempts to define the concept of prurient interest with the aid
of a dictionary are, as Professor Feinberg properly observes, 7 both
misguided and circular. 8 A major stumbling-block is that these defi3. Id. Liberalism is best characterized as a bundle of concepts not susceptible of
any one essentialist definition. See R. FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF RIGHTS 44 (1976). In
addition to what can be abbreviated as the "harm principle," see J. FEINBERG, SociAL
PHILOSOPHY 20-54 (1973), most conceptions of liberalism incorporate related but independent
concepts of individualism, equality, and political liberties. See, e.g., R. DwoRKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). In the remainder of this
commentary I will use the words "liberal" and "liberalism" to refer only to that particular
aspect of liberalism which forms the basis for Professor Feinberg's Article: the limitation of
governmental coercive power to those activities that are in the relevant sense other-regarding.
4. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
5. There are, of course, other aspects of these three basic elements, some of which, such
as the evaluation of the material as a whole and the necessity of determining prurient interest
in reference to the average person, were added to make clear the rejection of Regina v.
Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). See Feinberg, supra note 2, at 584-85. A thorough analysis
of the various tests is of course necessary in applying the basic test to actual materials, see
generally F. SclfAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 69-168 (1976), but such detail is unnecessary to
the more fundamental structure that Professor Feinberg and I are here discussing.
6. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
7. Feinberg, supra note 2, at 572-73.
8. "Prurient interest" is a term of art, drawing its meaning from its use in the cases
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nitions of prurience invariably refer to a certain state of mind,
whether it be lecherous, leering, itching, or morbid. 9 But the core
meaning of prurience, in the legal context, is rather the idea of
sexual arousal or excitement. 10 The important feature of sexual
arousal, in terms of separating speech from other conduct, is that it
is perceived as a primarily physical reaction. While it is of course
true that sexual arousal is significantly mental~ so too is sexual
arousal caused by direct physical stimulation. Another example is
the enjoyment of food. The fact that I adore escargots, while many
others find them disgusting, is not due to any physiological difference in taste buds. It is primarily a mental distinction. But that
does not make the sale or ingestion of escargots an activity protected
by the concept of free speech. The prurient interest test is the embodiment of Professor Feinberg's observation that some twodimensional materials are less similar to books than they are to
three-dimensional mechanical sex aids such as "French ticklers." 11
In short, that which appeals to the prurient interest is that which
is designed to cause actual sexual stimulation and generally does so
for its intended audience.
Such material is, of course, what we would ordinarily call pornographic, not obscene. Professor Feinberg is clearly correct in criticizing the Court for this confusing juxtaposition of terminology. 12
But he himself is still taken with the importance of the notion of
the obscene. In fact, the Court's misuse of the distinction between
the pornographic and the obscene is even more erroneous than is
perceived by Professor Feinberg, since the concept of the obscene is
wholly unrelated to the Court's professed aim of delineating the
boundaries of protected speech. Whether pornographic material (all
and from the deeper purpose of the approach that is embodied in those cases. As with many
legal terms, dictionary definitions are of little assistance, since the use in a legal system is
what gives rise to the meaning of the legal term. See generally J. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON
GoVERNMENT ch. V, notes to§ 6 (1776); H.L.A. HART, THE CoNCEProFLAw 13-17 (1961); Hart,
Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 L. Q. REv. 37 (1954); Summers, Legal Philosophy
Today-An Introduction, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (R. Summers ed. 1968). l have
recently made similar observations in the context of the constitutional defmition of the word
"speech." Schauer, Speech and "Speech": Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979).
9. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957). Indeed, the Court has never
again attempted to articulate a defmition for the concept of appeal to the prurient interest.
10. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), referring to "titillation," id. at
470, "erotically arousing," id. at 471, and "sexual stimulation," id.
11. Feinberg, supra note 2, at 579.
12. Id. at 573.
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or some) is obscene is indeed controversial, but it is also constitutionally uninteresting.! It is true that the Court has never sought to
demonstrate that pornographic material is obscene, but it is equally
true that it is not incumbent on the Court to do so. If the function
of a constitutional definition of obscenity is to exclude that which
bears no relevant similarities to the type of communication protected by the first amendment, then the identification of a category
of symbolic activity as primarily physical, rather than intellectual
or mental, is sufficient. The lack of obscenity in the narrow sense,
that is the lack of offensiveness, disgust, or abhorrence, has no bearing whatsoever on whether something is or is not speech in the
constitutional sense. Obscenity is not a necessary condition for the
exclusion of pornography from the ambit of the first amendment. 13
Obscenity may be a necessary condition for the permissibility of
regulation under liberal principles, but it has nothing to do with the
determination of whether material is sufficiently intellectual in content to come within the scope of the underlying principles of freedom of speech. Unfortunately, space does not permit me fully to
explore those principles here, so I must be content instead with the
rather conclusory observation that none of the philosophical justifications of a distinct concept of freedom of speech would put direct
sexual excitement within the confines of that principle. 14
13. Except as the Court has made it so by the unnecessary addition of the requirement
of patent offensiveness. See text accompanying notes 18 and 19 infra. See also Schauer,
Reflections on "Contemporary Community Standards": The Perpetuation of an Irrelevant
Concept in the Law of Obscenity, 5~ N. C.L. REv. 1 (1978).
14. Direct sexual excitement can hardly be said to contribute to the marketplace of
ideas, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), or to the
exchange of ideas and information that supports the process of democracy, A. MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND rrs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). On these theories, see generally
DuVal, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 161, 188-198 (1972). If
freedom of speech is based in whole or in part on the values of self-expression and selffulfillment, see Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 879-81 (1963), then it must be restricted to self-fulfillment by communication only,
rather than include other activities that would lead to self-fulfillment, for otherwise free
speech collapses into a general justification for individual liberty. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47lND. L.J. 1 (1971). There are those who expand
this view of freedom of speech to include an almost unlimited range of self-expressive activity.
See, e.g., L. TRmE, AMERICAN CoNSTlTUTIONAL LAW 578-79 (1978); Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964 (1978). But then any reference to
"speech" becomes superfluous. Aside from the extent to which such arguments abandon the
constitutional text, they also must implicitly allow the restriction of communication to the
same extent that they allow the restriction of non-communicative but self-expressive conduct.
Such a result is likely to be insufficiently protective of communication.
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Taken alone, however, the prurient interest test is constitutionally overinclusive, in that it allows the prosecution of material containing undoubted speech value. Prurient material may be inextricably coupled with material having intellectual value; or material
not ·intended to cause sexual arousal may have that effect on a
significant proportion of the recipients of that material; or material
intended as pornography may have clear but perhaps unintended
interest to scholars, as with Fanny Hill. In each of these instances
the prurient matter coexists with the type of intellectual communication that it is the very function of the first amendment to protect.
To compensate for this, we add the additional filter provided by the
requirement that the material have only prurient value, that it have
no "speech" value. This is the purpose of the mandate that the
material have no "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value, " 15 although the limitation to serious value is misguided. Once
we realize the purpose of this aspect of the test for obscenity, its
function as a filter for free speech values, and its function in filtering
out everything that is not wholly physical, we can see that the
limitation to the serious is wrong. In order for the test to function,
we must be able to say that only material that is completely nonintellectual is excluded from the definition.of "speech." But that is
a minor problem at this level of inquiry. The significant factor is
that what remains after applying these tests, is hard-core pornography16 in the strictest sense, material that is nothing more than a
linguistic or pictorial sex aid. What is left is remarkably similar, in
terms of speech values, to Professor Feinberg's characterization of
coprophagia-material that is "not the expression in language of an
opinion" and which does not "fall into a recognized genre of aesthetic expression." 17 And if this observation is correct, then the Supreme Court has done its job well. 18 It has devised a test that ex15. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
16. The Court in Miller made reference for the firot time to the requirement that only
"hard-core" material may be proscribed. 413 U.S. at 27. See generally F. ScHAUER, THE LAw
OF OBSCENITY 109-13 (1976). If the prurient interest and value tests are properly applied, the
hard-core requirement adds nothing. It is purely analytic. But if there is any truth to Mr.
Justice Stewart's observations that the recognition ofhard-core pornography is virtually
intuitive, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring), then the hardcore requirement can serve as a "check" to insure that the substantive tests are properly
applied.
17. Feinberg, supra note 2, at 572.
18. In actuality, the evaluation of the Court's test must be empirical. That is, has it
indeed allowed the prosecution of hard-core pornography while absolut!llY preventing the
prosecution of anything else on the grounds of obscenity? Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153
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eludes from regulation anything that can be called "speech" in
terms of the values implicit in the free speech clause of the first
amendment.
·
I have reserved until now any discussion of the second prong of
the Court's test, the requirement of patent offensiveness, because it
is here that the confusion of liberal values with free speech values
becomes most apparent. There is nothing in the notion of offensiveness that relates in any way to the identification of whether certain
conduct is or is not speech in the constitutional sense. Offensiveness
has no bearing on the determination of whether something is or is
not part of the process of intellectual communication. Material that
is communication, designed to appeal to the process of thought,
does not become less so because it is offensive. Thoughts and ideas
that offend are nonetheless thoughts and ideas. Conversely, direct
erotic stimulation does not become an idea or a thought or part of
the process of intellectual communication merely because the community is not offended. Lack of offense is not a defining characteristic of "communication," in either the ordinary or constitutional
sense. The patent offensiveness test is the bastard child of the test
for legal obscenity; for the patent offensiveness test in no way relates
to the purpose of the test for obscenity, if that purpose is to separate
speech in the constitutional sense from material that contains no
speech values.
Nonetheless, Professor Feinberg praises the concept of patent
offensiveness, since that requirement adds an element of liberalism
to the test for legal obscenity. It prevents the regulation of material
that is not speech, but which also does not offend. This contrast
between liberal values and free speech values is nowhere better
illustrated than by Professor Feinberg's incisive example of the
magazine designed for rock fetishists. 19 As described, the magazine
is designed solely to appeal to the prurient interest, and has absolutely no literacy, artistic, political, or scientific value. Without the
patent offensiveness test, the magazine is constitutionally unprotected. But the addition of that test saves the magazine from potential prosecution since it is unlikely that the magazine is offensive to
any significant proportion of the contemporary community, however defined. But if we take Professor Feinberg's characterization of
(1974), is plainly a counter-example, but since Jenkins the tests set forth in Miller seem to
have served tolerably well, at least in terms of the majority's own purpose.
19. Feinberg, supra note 2, at 594.
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the magazine at face value, it is still not speech in the constitutional
sense, even though its circulation causes no offense. In terms of the
values of freedom of speech, a restriction on selling this particular
magazine is analytically indistinguishable from a prohibition on the
sale· of rocks themselves, where those rocks are to be used by rock
fetishists for the purpose of sexual stimulation. It is of course silly
and illiberal to regulate the sale of rocks for this purpose, but not
because of anything concerning the communication of ideas or information. Indeed, the impermissibility of regulation of the sale of rock
fetishists' magazines or rocks for rock fetis.hists is analogous to the
moral impermissibility of regulation of cigarettes, sweets, or fried
foods. By drawing this comparison we can focus on the contrast
between the principles embodied in the concept of free speech and
the principles embodied in this particular facet of the concept of
liberalism.
Both at the level of pure political theory and at the level of
constitutional law, we must recognize that free speech concerns and
liberal concerns are distinct. The two are certainly not inconsistent
with each other. Indeed, they are frequently found together. But this
is not a matter of logical necessity. The liberal would protect pornography for the same reason he would protect private homosexual
behavior, prostitution, sweets, fried foods, long hair, and short
skirts. They are all in the relevant sense self-regarding. But we do
not protect speech because it is self-regarding. Indeed, it is one of
the most important other-regarding activities in which we engage.
Whatever truth there may be to the saying that "sticks and stones
may break my bones, but names will never hurt me," it is hardly
an appropriate generalization for the whole range of communicative
conduct. On a personal level, speech may offend me, humiliate me,
damage my reputation, or cause me to lose tangible advantages.
Derogatory comments about my scholarship by an established
scholar would do me far more harm than would be done if that same
established scholar kicked me in the shins or broke my arm. Walter
Kerr's critical review of a Broadway play is hardly self-regarding.
It causes more financial damage than most of the actions that give
rise to legal liability at common law.
Once we realize that these and most other forms of protected
speech are covered by the principle of freedom of speech despite the
fact that they are other-regarding, then the divergence between liberal theory and free speech theory becomes apparent. Under a principle of free speech that creates an independent restraint on govern-
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ment power, 20 acts covered by the principle may be protected even
though the consequences caused by these acts would be otherwise
sufficient to justify regulation even in a society based upon liberal
principles.
Drawing this distinction between liberal theory and free speech
theory is important in two respects. First, it demonstrates that the
concept of liberalism, as here used by Professor Feinberg, does little
if anything to explain a free speech principle that protects otherregarding activity. For that we must look elsewhere, whether it be
to the importance of speech in determining truth or identifying
error, 21 to the importance of speech as an adjunct of the democratic
process, 22 or to the importance of speech in providing the informa20. A principle of free speech that is totally congruent with or totally subsumed by a
principle of individual liberty is for that reason unnecessary. When we talk about free speech,
we are referring to a principle that is at least to some extent di!!tinguishable from other
principles of political or social philosophy.
21. There are in fact three permutations of the "marketplace of ideas" rationale for
freedom of speech. The first assumes that there is some objectively verifiable truth, and that
the free exchange of ideas and opinion will lead us to discover it. See, e.g., T. JEFFERSON, FmsT
INAUGURAL AnDRESS, in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 384-85 (S. Padover ed. 1943); Viereck v.
United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting); International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.); J.
MILTON, AREoPAGlTlCA: A SPEECH FOR THE LmERTY oF UNLICENSED PRlNTlNG 78, 116-28 (J.C.
Suffolk ed. 1968);
Bagehot, The Metaphysical Basis of Toleration, inn LITERARY STUDIES
422, 425 (3d ed. R.H. Hutton ed. 1884). This is the theory of rationality, the theory of the
Enlightenment, and is properly subject to criticism by those who take a dimmer, and perhaps
more realistic, view of the ability of people to identify truth; See Simon, A Comment on
Censorship, 171NT'L PHIL. Q. 33, 37 (1977); Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954:
A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. Cm. L. REv. 173, 187 (1956). This is
hardly a new observation. See Horace's reference to "ciuium ardor praua jubentium" (the
frenzy of the citizens bidding what is wrong), in HoRACE's ODES, bk m, ode iii, THE ODES OF
HoRACE 82 (R. Dunsany trans. 1947), quoted by Jefferson in his letter to Madison of December
20, 1787, 6 THE WRmNGS OF THoMAS JEFFERSON 391-92 (memorial ed. 1904).
Alternatively, there is the more skeptical epistemology of, for example, Holmes, which
can be taken either to define truth in terms of what is accepted by the marketplace, or to
take the marketplace as the best test of truth we have, even if it is not always perfect. Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For criticism of this
pragmatist epistemology in a legal context, see, e.g., Auerbach, supra, at 187; M. LERNER,
THE MIND AND THE FAITH OF JusTICE HoLMES 290 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1954).
Finally, one could look upon the process of exchanging and challenging views not as a
means of identifying truth, but as a way to identify error. See J .S. MILL, ON LmERTY ch. 2
(1859); K. PoPPER, THE OPEN SociETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th ed.1966). As long as we appreciate
the identification of an error as itself an epistemic advance, then such a view frees the
marketplace theory from any dependence on the existence or identification of any verifiable
truth.
22. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14; Emerson, supra note 15, at 882-83; DuVal, supra
note 15, at 194-98; Morrow, Speech, Expression, and the Constitution, 85 ETHICS 235 (1975);
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tion and opinions that enable us to exercise individual autonomy,
as-Professor Scanlon has elsewhere argued. 23 Secondly, the distinc~
tion between free speech and liberalism renders the free speech
principle immune from rejections of liberalism. If free speech is
congruent with or derived from the principles of liberalism, then a
rejection of liberalism must pro tanto be a rejection of freedom of
speech. This has significant practical importance under the current
interpretation of the American Constitution, since recent decisions
have made it clear that the Supreme Court does not now see liberal~
ism as one of the values embodied in any part of the Constitution. 24
This is amply demonstrated by recent decisions allowing the regula·
tion of hair length, 25 private homosexual behavior, 26 and hard·core
pornography, 21 as well as by lower court decisions such as those
allowing the regulation of marijuana. 28 If and only if we distinguish
between liberalism and free speech can we say that this judicial
rejection of liberalism as a constitutional principle, whether right or
wrong, has nonetheless caused no diminution of the free speech
principle. Only a truly independent free speech principle emerges
unscathed from judicial or societal rejections of liberalism.
The pitfalls of failing to maintain this separation are demon·
strated by Professor Feinberg's observation that inoffensively ex~
pressed theological and political opinions fail to qualify as nuisances
and thus cannot be regulated in any way. 29 But the implication of
Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment,
79 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1965).
23. Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1974). See
also Scanlon, Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1020, 1042-44 (1973).
24. The clearest statement of this view is in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49 (1973), where the majority catalogued various non-liberal justifications for the regulation
of hard-core pornography and found them constitutionally sufficient. See generally Hindes,
Morality Enforcement Through the Criminal Law and the Modern Doctrine of Substantive
Due Process, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 344 (1977); Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals and the Police
Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976);
Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw.
U. L. REv. 417 (1976).
25. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at
958 (1978); Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CoRNELL
L. REv. 563, 600-10 (1977).
26. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g without opinion, 403
F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). See Wilkinson & White, supra note 25, at 587-600.
27. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
28. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 243 N.E. 2d 898 (1969); People v.
Aguilar, 257 Cal. App. 2d 597, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1968). See generally Hindes, supra note 24;
L. Tribe, supra note 14, at 908:10.
29. Feinberg, supra note 2, at 571.
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this observation is that offensively expressed theological and political opinions can qualify as nuisances and can thus be subject to
some regulation. But this is not and should not be correct. Even
offensively expressed theological and political opinions are immune
from regulation based on their content, 30 as we can see from Cohen
v. California, 31 in which the Supreme Court refused to allow Cohen
to be convicted for wearing a jacket bearing the message, "Fuck the
Draft." If the capacity of this message to cause offense to unwilling
viewers is the appropriate standard, then Cohen should have been
kept out of the courthouse lobby, or perhaps excluded from the
public forum entirely. He might have been restricted to wearing his
jacket inside, with a sign on his house saying "Offensively expressed
political commentary available within." Or he might have been
forced to cover his jacket with a plain brown wrapper. Indeed,
Cohen's commentary is rather mild compared to other instances
that have come before the courts. In Kois v. Wisconsin 32 and numerous other cases, 33 the courts have protected underground newspapers and similar publications expressing political commentary by
the use of sexual and scatological references that would undoubtedly offend large numbers of people. Nor is it particularly relevant
that these publications are avoidable. People may very well be offended by public speeches advocating atheism, by speeches referring to political figures in sexual or scatological terms, or by mutilation or desecration of the American flag. 34 The use of offensiveness
as a relevant factor in free speech determinations would substantially limit the ability to express in forceful terms political and
religious ideas that are inconsistent with those held by the majority
of the population. The exclusion of the offensive in the area of
30. While time, place, and manner restrictions on speech are permissible, such restrictions, ultimately based on nuisance-type considerations, must be applied to all speech without regard to its content. See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment,
43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20 (1975). But see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
31. 403 u.s. 15 (1971).
32. 408 u.s. 229 (1972).
33. See, e.g., Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976) (per curiam), enforcing Bucolo v.
Florida, 421 U.S. 927 (1975), rev'g without opinion, 303 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1974); Dillingham v.
State, 9 Md. App. 669, 267 A.2d 777 (1970) ..
34. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). As the Court noted in Spence, id.
at 411 n.4, the first amendment incorporates the view that the method of expression is
protected just as is the substantive content of the message expressed. See generally Schauer,
Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA.
L. REv. 263 (1978).
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speech would limit commentary to polite commentary, 35 and such
a limitation of the free speech principle would exclude from public
consideration many of the ideas of the strident critics who have
often made the most significant contributions to the public debate.
When the first amendment became part of the constitution in
1791, there existed only a few forums for expression. There was no
radio or television, few newspapers, few periodicals, and comparatively few political tracts published for private distribution. It was
not at all unreasonable to assume that a mildly expressed and
closely reasoned political or social or theological opinion would in
fact be read or heard by most people having any interest in such
matters. But now, with radio, television, and film, with almost innumerable newspapers, magazines, books, and pamphlets, and with
so many people speaking out about so many things, there is perhaps
"too much" speech, in the sense that it is impossible to read or hear
even a minute percentage of what is being expressed. There is a din
of speech, and our limited capacity to read or hear has resulted in
effective censorship by the proliferation of opinion rather than by
the restriction of opinion. 31 Under such circumstances it is frequently necessary, literally or figuratively, to shout to be heard. The
use of offensive words or pictures is one very important way of
shouting to be heard, one way of getting the listener's attention. To
say that offensive speech may be restricted, even as a nuisance, is
to limit the effectiveness of speech, and also to engage in the very
type of content regulation that most seriously contravenes current
free speech legal doctrine. 37
All of this may call to mind the case of FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 38 in which the Supreme Court upheld a restriction on
George Carlin's "Seven Dirty Words" monologue as broadcast over
the airwaves. The Court, without even mentioning the scarcity rationale for increased regulation of the electronic media, 39 relied on
35. For an argument for just such a limitation, see J. TussMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE
MIND (1977). See also A. Cox, THE RoLE OF THE SUPREME CouRT IN AMERICAN GovERNMENT
(1976); Kendall, The Open Society and Its Fallacies, 54 AM. Pot.. Sci. REv. 972 (1960).
36. See Reich, Making Free Speech Audible, 200 THE NATION 138 (Feb. 1965).
37. See, supra note 30.
38. 438 u.s. 726 (1978).
39. 438 U.S. at 748. The scarcity rationale holds that the technologically limited num.
her of broadcast bands means that the allocating authority must of necessity engage in
selections based on content that would not be permitted for other media. This doctrine has
not gone uncriticized. See generally Van Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First Amendment:
Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C. L. REv. 539 (1978).
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the extent to which the repeated use of these words would offend
unwilling listeners. 40 Yet the monologue itself was intended solely as
commentary on political values, on social values, and on the very
concept of offense. It would be absurd to suggest that Carlin intended to cause sexual arousal, just as it would be absurd to suggest
that this was Cohen's intention, 41 even though some of the words
used have sexual connotations in other contexts. This unfortunate
opinion, I would submit, is perhaps related to the Court's inclusion
of the test for patent offensiveness in its definition of obscenity,
because it is based on the erroneous view that offensiveness of an
utterance bears a relationship to its free speech value. 42 By recognizing this error we may be less protective of pornography, but we will
be more protective of constitutionally significant speech.
I do not intend to suggest that Professor Feinberg is totally
oblivious to-much of what I have said here. He recognizes that hardcore pornography is more analogous in relevant respects to sexual
activity than it is to speech in the constitutional sense. 43 He recognizes, properly, that hard-core pornography is not an argument for
sex-it is sex, and as such it is only implausibly protected by the
first amendment. 44 Professor Feinberg notes as well that the mere
fact that pornography is not protected by the first amendment does
not mean that pornography cannot be protected by some other part
of the Constitution, or that if the Constitution does not protect
pornography at all, restrictions on pornography may still be subject
to criticism on a philosophical level in terms of liberal values. 45 But
it is this very observation that serves to make Professor Feinberg's
commentary on the Supreme Court's obscenity decisions most
40. Indeed, the Supreme Court characterized the monologue as containing "patently
offensive sexual and excretory language." 438 U.S. at 747.
· 41. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.15, 20 (1971). See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study
in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv.
1482, 1493 (1975) ("anyone who finds Cohen's jacket 'obscene' or erotic had better have his
valves checked").
42. This conjecture as to causal relationship is supported by the Court's use in Pacifica
of the "patently offensive" language that originated with the obscenity cases. See generally
Schauer, Reflections on Contemporary Community Standards: The Perpetuation of an Irrelevant Concept in the Law of Obscenity, 56 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1978).
43. Feinberg, supra note 2, at 585.
44. See Schauer, Speech and "Speech": Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899, 920-28 (1979). See also Finnis,
"Reason and Passion": The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U.
PA. L. REv. 222 (1967).
45. Feinberg, supra note 2, at 579-80.
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anomalous. It may seem paradoxical, but a liberal criticism of the
results in obscenity cases must not be a criticism of the decisions.
The only exception is Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 48 which in
relevant respects is not a decision on obscenity, but an argument for
the permissibility of regulation of self-regarding conduct in general.
If one wants to criticize the Supreme Court's approval47 of the regulation of pornography, one must·criticize those decisions that have
rejected liberal ideology as a constitutional doctrine, the decisions
dealing with hair length, private homosexual conduct, and the like.
For if one accepts the Court's goals, or non-goals if you will, then
the obscenity decisions, with the exception of the patent offensiveness requirement, and with the exception of the limitation to serious
value, embody a basic analytic structure that is consistent with the
first amendment and that is consistent with the underlying philosophical premises of the concept of freedom of speech. Free speech
has little to do with liberalism, and criticizing free speech decisions
for not being liberal is like criticizing our misguided genuis for
building a bad bomb. The Court's goals are properly subject to
criticism on liberal grounds, but it is not obscenity doctrine that
provides the fodder for this criticism.
46. 413 u.s. 49 (1973).
47. The Court has itself contributed to criticism such as that of Professor Feinberg, in
that it has frequently condemned pornography, rather than merely approving of its regulation. The Court does not regulate obscenity. It only allows its regulation by the states or by
the federal government. In terms of the analytical structure of the Roth-Miller-Paris approach, the Court's caustic remarks about the business of pornography are mere surplusage,
serving only to fuel criticism like Professor Feinberg's, and to lead many to question the
Court's motives. Mter all, it is possible to come to the right result for the wrong reasons.

